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Abstract: 
In the microstructure literature, information asymmetry is an important determinant of market 
liquidity. The classic setting is that uninformed dedicated liquidity suppliers charge price 
concessions when incoming market orders are likely to be informationally motivated. In limit 
order book markets, however, this relationship is less clear, as market participants can switch 
roles, and freely choose to immediately demand or patiently supply liquidity by submitting 
either market or limit orders. We study the importance of information asymmetry in limit 
order books based on a recent sample of thirty German DAX stocks. We find that 
Hasbrouck’s (1991) measure of trade informativeness Granger-causes book liquidity, in 
particular that required to fill large market orders. Picking-off risk due to public news induced 
volatility is more important for top-of-the book liquidity supply. In our multivariate analysis 
we control for volatility, trading volume, trading intensity and order imbalance to isolate the 
effect of trade informativeness on book liquidity. 
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 1 Introduction
The classic microstructure literature distinguishes liquidity suppliers and liquidity deman-
ders, which naturally introduces information asymmetry. That is, liquidity suppliers trade
against potentially privately-informed liquidity demanders and charge them an increased
price concession to protect themselves.1 This deters uninformed, hedging-motivated liq-
uidity demand and, in the extreme, might cause the market to break down. Information
asymmetry thus reduces welfare (cf. Biais et al. 2005, p.223-227). Easley et al. (2002) pro-
vide evidence that asymmetric information risk is priced, as stocks for which they estimate
a high probability of informed trading have to oﬀer higher expected returns.
With the advent of electronic limit order book (LOB) markets, however, the dis-
tinction between uninformed liquidity suppliers and potentially informed liquidity demanders
became blurred. Investors arriving at the market can choose to demand liquidity through
a market order, but they can also enter their trading interest in the book via a limit order.
In the latter case they eﬀectively supply liquidity. It is therefore unclear to what extent the
increased price concession due to information asymmetry, one of the cornerstones of classic
microstructure, still matters for liquidity supply in electronic LOB markets.
We exploit a comprehensive sample of thirty index stocks traded in the limit order
book of the German Stock Exchange to empirically assess the eﬀect of information asymme-
try on the supply of liquidity. The main advantage is that the data come from a pure limit
order book market which, for these stocks, captures over 95% of the non-OTC order ﬂow.
In a time series approach we relate Hasbrouck’s (1991) informativeness measure to
limit order book liquidity. We ﬁnd that trade informativeness Granger-causes price con-
cessions for large market orders, but has little impact for average-size market orders. For
top-of-the book liquidity supply, picking-oﬀ risk due to public news induced volatility is
more important. In a multivariate analysis of the impact of trade informativeness on book
liquidity we allow for control variables such as realised volatility, trading intensity, and trade
size.
The main motivation for our study is to provide empirical evidence to feed the
rapidly expanding theoretical literature on limit order markets. Recent LOB theory can
broadly be classiﬁed into static and dynamic models. Static models strictly distinguish be-
tween liquidity suppliers and liquidity demanders. Only the latter have access to private
information about the fundamental asset price. The limit order book is the optimal market
structure in this framework, as it fosters competition among suppliers of liquidity. In par-
1ticular, Glosten (1994) shows that risk-neutral limit order submitters compete for supply so
that, in equilibrium, the marginal order breaks even in terms of expected proﬁt. Limit order
traders incur adverse-selection costs as they trade against a (potentially) informed market
order. Biais et al. (2000) consider an extension with a limited number of strategic suppliers.
They show that the Glosten result obtains if their number goes to inﬁnity. Seppi (1997)
and Parlour and Seppi (2003) compare the LOB market with a hybrid market, where the
limit order book competes with a strategic specialist who has the privilege of ex-post price
improvement. Biais et al. (1998) show how the LOB market is more likely to implement the
competitive equilibrium of strategic suppliers when compared to a dealer or a ﬂoor market.
The class of dynamic LOB models does not distinguish ex-ante between liquidity
suppliers and demanders, but let agents arrive randomly in the market to decide whether
to submit a limit order (act as liquidity supplier) or to submit a market order (act as
liquidity demander), or do nothing. These agents trade-oﬀ the cost of immediacy (to pay
the spread) associated with a market order against the costs of a limit order submission,
i.e. possibly inﬁnitely delayed execution and picking-oﬀ risk. Picking-oﬀ risk occurs when
limit orders are not monitored continuously, so that public information arrivals mechanically
make limit buys execute more often when the value drops and make limit sells execute more
often when the value rises. The agents in these dynamic models trade to lock in some
private value orthogonal to common value innovations. Information is symmetric and there
is no adverse-selection risk (cf. Parlour 1998, Foucault 1999, Goettler et al. 2005, Holliﬁeld
et al. 2006, Holliﬁeld et al. 2004, Foucault et al. 2005, Rosu 2009). To the best of our
knowledge, Goettler et al. (2009) is the single exception as they propose a dynamic LOB
model with adverse-selection risk.
One reason why dynamic LOB models abstract from adverse-selection risk is math-
ematical tractability, but Foucault et al. (2005) and Rosu (2009) also justify the assumption
with Huang and Stoll’s (1997) ﬁnding that the majority of the bid-ask spread (88.8%) is
due to non-informational frictions. We note that while dynamic LOB models do consider
picking-oﬀ risk, this risk is fundamentally diﬀerent from adverse-selection risk, as the latter
involves a (potential) transfer of surplus from uninformed to informed traders and, therefore,
potentially impedes trade. We henceforth interpret picking-oﬀ risk in the narrow sense of
“adverse” execution due to public information, consistent with dynamic LOB models. In
real-world markets, such adverse execution might also be due to private information in the
order ﬂow. In our multivariate analysis, both aspects of adverse execution are accounted
for by including a proxy for public news induced volatility (realised volatility) as a control
variable along with Hasbrouck’s (1991) measure of trade informativeness.
2In addition to the time series analysis of trade informativeness and liquidity supply,
we also pursue a structural approach in order to test the Glosten (1994) model. For this test,
we have a limit order book in mind that quickly replenishes to equilibrium after each market
order. We follow Sand˚ as (2001) who tests the Glosten model using three months of data
(starting Dec 1991) for ten stocks traded on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE). Formal
tests performed by Sand˚ as (2001) reject the model, but one could argue that the SSE market
design is too diﬀerent from the theoretical setting of the Glosten model in the ﬁrst place.
We believe our data are more appropriate because of three main reasons. First, the German
electronic market covers over 95% of non-OTC trades, whereas the Swedish sample missed “a
signiﬁcant fraction of the turnover” due to transactions on London’s SEAQ International and
NASDAQ (see Sand˚ as (2001, p.708)). Second, entry as an implicit market maker through
limit order activity is more attractive. The reason is that the German exchange, as opposed
to the 1991 Stockholm exchange, does not charge for limit order submission or cancellation.
Third, our more recent sample beneﬁts from technological development since 1991. Early
evidence of a quickly replenishing book is the high limit order activity that we measure in
our data. We ﬁnd that the ratio of limit to market orders is 6.1, which compares to a 1.7
ratio for Sand˚ as’ SSE sample.
Empirical evidence consistent with a replenishing “Glosten”-book is that on poor
book liquidity limit orders are more likely than market orders (cf. Biais et al. 1995, Griﬃths
et al. 2000, Ahn et al. 2001, Ranaldo 2004). This evidence, however, is also consistent
with dynamic limit order book models. There is, however, also some evidence in favour
of a replenishing Glosten-book after privately informed market orders, which is harder to
reconcile with current dynamic models that assume symmetric information. As for private
information in market orders, Biais et al. (1995) study the Paris LOB market and ﬁnd
that, along with the ask, the bid changes after a market buy, which indicates that market
orders are informative. Bloomﬁeld et al. (2009) conduct an LOB market experiment and
one of their ﬁndings is that informed traders use market orders relatively more often than
noise traders or liquidity traders. As for a quickly replenishing book, Biais et al. (1995,
p.1693) document that durations are 30% shorter after a large market order and interpret
this ﬁnding as “traders quickly place orders within the best quotes to supply liquidity at
relatively advantageous prices and to obtain time priority (p.1683)”. Ranaldo (2004) reports
a similar ﬁnding for the Swiss Stock Exchange. Finally, LOB markets are easily accessible,
transparent electronic markets, and any proﬁt opportunities in the book should therefore be
quickly ﬁlled by outside liquidity providers.
There is also evidence against a quickly replenishing Glosten-LOB. For the hybrid
3NYSE market, Harris and Hasbrouck (1996, p.230) ﬁnd that “expected proﬁts accruing to
an oﬀ-the-ﬂoor trader who attempts to behave as a dealer are generally negative...”. In
hybrid markets, though, limit orders are at a disadvantage relative to the specialist who can
cream-skim arriving market orders, as she can decide ex-post (i.e. after arrival) whether or
not to supply liquidity (cf. Seppi 1997, Parlour and Seppi 2003).
Our main results can be summarised as follows. Consistent with Sand˚ as’s (2001)
results, our formal tests also reject the structural model. The informativeness parameter,
Glosten’s α, turns insigniﬁcant when based on the updating conditions for an equilibrium
LOB. One interpretation is that book replenishment from transaction to transaction is noisy
and potentially incomplete. This motivates our alternative approach that does not rely
on a parametrised model, and uses the long-term price impact of trades to measure their
informativeness. This approach ﬁnds empirical support for the main prediction of static
LOB models that informativeness matters for book liquidity, which we measure through price
concessions of market orders of diﬀerent sizes. We ﬁnd that large order price concessions are
most sensitive to trade informativeness, as opposed to any of the control variables employed
in the multivariate analysis, e.g. realised volatility. However, we also ﬁnd that the bid-ask
spread and the average-size order price concessions respond stronger to our proxy of market
volatility, i.e. picking-oﬀ risk that is unrelated to private information.
These ﬁndings relate to two recent papers on the Island ECN, which has the addi-
tional feature of competition for order ﬂow with other non-OTC venues, most notably the
NASDAQ. Consistent with our ﬁndings, Hasbrouck and Saar (2007) document for a cross-
section of securities that volatility is associated with lower depth in the book. We contribute
by emphasising trade informativeness, where we control for volatility. And, Hasbrouck and
Saar (2009) ﬁnd that limit orders should not be viewed solely as “patient” liquidity supply,
as some “ﬂeeting” limit orders appear to hunt for hidden depth.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the institu-
tional background, the available data, and presents summary statistics. Section 3 reviews the
Glosten (1994) model and estimates the structural parameters by GMM following Sand˚ as
(2001). Section 4 studies time-varying trade informativeness using the Hasbrouck (1991)
measure and conducts Granger causality tests to study whether high informativeness causes
poor book liquidity and vice versa. In a multivariate analysis we add control variables such
as volatility, trade size, and duration to isolate the trade informativeness eﬀect. Section 5
discusses the results and Section 6 concludes.
42 Institutional Background and Data Sample
2.1 The XETRA Limit Order Book
The German Stock Exchange (GSE) operates the electronic limit order book XETRA accord-
ing to trading rules that are similar to previously studied limit order markets e.g. Euronext,
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Swedish Stock Exchange. We refer to Biais et al.
(1995) for a detailed description of these rules. Trading starts at 9 a.m. (Central European
Time CET) with an opening auction and closes at 5.30 p.m. with a closing auction. Around
noon, trading is interrupted for the “mid-day” auction. For the DAX30 constituent stocks
studied in this paper there are no designated market makers. Market orders larger than the
depth available at the best quote automatically “walk up the book.”
XETRA is quite close to the stylised setting analysed in Glosten’s (1994) limit order
book model, but deviates in two ways. First, it allows for so-called iceberg orders, which
are similar to standard limit orders with the exception that part of the limit order volume is
not displayed in the book. This hidden volume enjoys price priority over other limit orders,
but not time priority. In the remainder of the paper, we focus on the results based on the
visible book. For the sake of a robustness check, we also perform the analysis on the total
book and ﬁnd that the results are not aﬀected. The second main diﬀerence to the Glosten
framework is that the XETRA limit order book faces some local, regional, and international
competition for order ﬂow. Parallel to the XETRA system, the German Stock Exchange
maintains a trading ﬂoor which, by all means, functions as an upstairs market. Regional
competition comes from smaller German exchanges. Finally, eleven of the thirty DAX stocks
are cross-listed as ADR at the NYSE. However, we can safely ignore these alternative trading
venues in the analysis as the XETRA system has a market share of at least 95%. Our stocks
also trade in an OTC market, but it is hard to measure the size of this market as trades do
not need to be reported.
2.2 Data and Summary Statistics
From the GSE, we have received data on all XETRA order book events—entries, cancella-
tions, revisions, expirations, partial-ﬁlls and full-ﬁlls of market, limit, and iceberg orders—for
a three month period: January 2nd through March 31st, 2004. In this study, we focus on the
thirty blue chip stocks in the German DAX index. We use the data to perform a real-time
5reconstruction of the order book sequences. For that purpose, we start with an initial state
of the book each day and use all order events to re-build the book sequences for the remain-
der of the day, accounting for every event that changes the order book. Our reconstruction
procedure permits distinguishing the visible and the hidden part of the order book.
[insert Table 1 here]
Summary statistics in Table 1 show that XETRA trading is very active, in particular
in terms of limit order submissions. For the average stock in the sample, the average daily
number of limit orders submitted to the system is 12,785, i.e. 25 limit orders per minute.
Of these submissions, 10,887 are cancelled prior to execution on the same day. The average
number of trades per day is 2,099, i.e. 4 trades per minute. These numbers suggest that limit
order traders actively follow the market and submit orders to beneﬁt from proﬁt opportuni-
ties in the spirit of the Glosten-model. It is interesting to note that relatively many orders
arrive as limit orders (as opposed to market orders or marketable limit orders) in comparison
to what we know from previous studies. For the XETRA data, the limit to market order
ratio is 6.1, whereas this ratio is, for example, 1.1 for the Paris Bourse in November 1991
and 1.7 for the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) from December 1991 through February
1992 (cf. Biais et al. 1995, Sand˚ as 2001).
The descriptive statistics reveal three more interesting stylised facts of the data.
First, we present the frequency of market orders that execute not only at the best quote,
but also at prices strictly inside the book. We ﬁnd that 15.2% of all market orders “walk
up the book,” which demonstrates the relevancy of liquidity supply beyond the best quotes.
Second, we ﬁnd that bid-ask spreads are small, 9 basis points on average, which is consistent
with a very active and liquid market. Third, we ﬁnd considerable cross-sectional variation
and thus decide to sort the sample stocks into quartiles based on trade activity. Earlier
work shows that informed trading is more important for small, less active stocks (cf. Easley
et al. 1996).
3 Structural Econometrics: The Glosten Model
To study the importance of informativeness for book liquidity we ﬁrst follow Sand˚ as (2001)
and estimate the structural parameters of the Glosten (1994) model. We brieﬂy review the
model and the implied moment conditions used for GMM estimation, and then present our
6estimates.
3.1 General Features of the Model
There are two types of agents in the market: liquidity suppliers and liquidity demanders.
Liquidity suppliers are patient uninformed risk-neutral agents who submit limit orders to the
book to maximise expected proﬁt. Liquidity demanders submit market orders and may have
private information about the value of the security. Liquidity demanders arrive randomly at
the market and we organise our time line accordingly. The sequencing of events is such that
between the arrival of market orders, the book is quickly updated by liquidity suppliers, as
illustrated in the following graph:
value
state of
Z(t−1)
value
book
true market
order
v(t−1) X(t)
true
v(t)
state of
book
Z(t)
market
order
X(t+1)
true
value
v(t+1)
state of
book
Z(t+1)
time
where Xt is the signed market order size (number of shares), vt is the true value of the
security after arrival of market order Xt, and Zt captures the state of the order book (e.g.,
bid-ask spread, depth at the best quote).
Liquidity demanders. The liquidity demander who arrives at time t submits a
market order of size Xt, a number that is positive for buys and negative for sells. We assume
that buys and sells are equally likely and Xt is independent from Xs for s  = t. For order
size, we assume a symmetric, two-sided exponential distribution:
f(|Xt|) =
1
2λ
e
|Xt|
λ (1)
where λ > 0 is the average order size in absolute terms. To capture trade informativeness,
we assume the following process for the true value of the security vt right after the arrival
7of the market order at event time t:
vt = E[vt|vt−1,Xt] + ηt = c + vt−1 + αXt + ηt (2)
where ηt accounts for the arrival of public information between the trades at event time t
and at t − 1. The key parameter in the model is α, which captures the informativeness
(with respect to the asset value) of the arriving market order. We refer to the parameter as
Glosten’s alpha.
Liquidity suppliers. We assume that liquidity suppliers incur ﬁxed order-processing
cost γ when transacting with incoming market orders. They submit limit orders right after
the arrival of market order Xt at various prices until the marginal order at each of these
prices breaks even. For example, suppose that price level p1,t is the lowest price above vt
at which it is proﬁtable to supply a limit sell of strictly positive quantity. Limit orders will
ﬁll the book at this price and the expected proﬁt on the q1,tth share at price level p1,t, is
determined by:
E[(p1,t − E[vt+1|Xt+1] − γ)I[Xt+1>q1,t]], (3)
where (p1,t − E[vt+1|Xt+1]) is the diﬀerence between the price the limit order trades at and
the expected fundamental value conditional on the next market order Xt+1. I[Xt+1>q1,t] is
an indicator function that is one if Xt+1 is larger than q1,t—in which case the limit order
executes—and zero otherwise. A zero expected proﬁt condition on the last unit (as the queue
clears according to ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served time priority) determines the equilibrium depth q1,t
at the best ask price p1,t. Once the equilibrium depth is reached, limit order traders will
consider submitting a unit at the next price on the grid, one tick above p1,t. They consider
adding this unit, because the revenue they get on execution is one tick higher than on p1,t.
The equilibrium depths on both sides of the limit order book are given by the recursions:
q+k,t =
p+k,t − vt − γ
α
−
+k−1  
i=+1
qi,t − λ k = 1,2,... (ask side) (4)
q−k,t =
vt − p−k,t − γ
α
−
−k+1  
i=−1
qi,t − λ k = 1,2,... (bid side).
The state of the book is described by the set of bid (p−k,t) and ask (p+k,t) prices and their
associated depths (q−k,t and q+k,t). Equation 4 shows that the trade informativeness measure
8α is a key determinant of book liquidity.
3.2 Moment Conditions
We follow Sand˚ as (2001) and use three types of moment conditions: two of these are based
on equation (4) where we assume that limit order books have reﬁlled to equilibrium when
we take snapshot t (which will be just before the arrival of the next market order Xt+1).
The third condition identiﬁes the expected market order size λ.
Break-even conditions. For the ﬁrst type of moment conditions, we use informa-
tion in the book. In order to eliminate the fundamental value, we add the equilibrium depth
associated with the kth price at the bid side of the book from the corresponding equation
at the ask side of the book (see equation (4)) and assume that the equations hold up to an
error term:
E
 
p+k,t − p−k,t − 2γ − α
 
+k  
i=+1
qi,t +
−k  
i=−1
qi,t + 2λ
  
= 0. k = 1,2,... (5)
Updating restrictions. For the second type of moment conditions, we use the
time dimension and subtract the kth price in the book at time t − 1 from the kth price at
time t. This removes the fundamental asset value vt of equation (2), and we get:
E
 
∆p+k,t − α
 
+k  
i=+1
qi,t+1 −
+k  
i=+1
qi,t
 
− c − αXt
 
= 0 k = 1,2,... (6)
E
 
∆p−k,t + α
 
−k  
i=−1
qi,t+1 −
−k  
i=−1
qi,t
 
− c − αXt
 
= 0 k = 1,2,...
where ∆pk,t = pk,t − pk,t−1.
Market order size condition. We use the expected size of the market order to
identify λ (see equation (1))via
E(|Xt| − λ) = 0. (7)
93.3 GMM Estimation Results
We use GMM to estimate the structural model based on the four best quotes on both sides
of the book. This yields thirteen moment conditions: four from the break-even conditions of
equation (5), eight from the updating restrictions of equation (6), and one from the market
order size condition of equation (7). The estimation is based on event time, where the arrival
of a market order marks an event. In the implementation, we take the snapshot of the order
book just ahead of the arrival of the next market order, whereby we assume that durations
between trades—time between market order arrivals—are long enough so that competitive
limit order traders have time to reﬁll the book in between trades. We consider this a credible
assumption for our sample, given the high limit order activity. As pointed out above, on
average 6.1 limit orders are submitted in between two market order arrivals (see Table 1).
[insert Table 2 here]
Table 2 reports the GMM estimates of all parameters in the Glosten-model. We
estimate on a stock by stock basis, but report averages per trade activity quartile (where
Q1 contains the most actively traded stocks) in order to conserve space. We standardise the
informativeness measure α to enable meaningful comparison across stocks:2
α
G = α
e50,000
P 2 (8)
where P is the average price for the stock throughout the sample period. We use the super-
script G to indicate that it is the Glosten-α, which we will later compare to an alternative
measure, the Hasbrouck-α. We interpret αG, in the context of the Glosten-model, as the
relative price impact of a e50,000 market order.
Our ﬁndings are similar to those reported by Sand˚ as (2001). First, we ﬁnd that
trade informativeness αG decreases monotonically with trade activity in the cross-section.
Market orders seem to be most informative for the least actively traded stocks’ quartile (Q4),
which contains the smallest stocks in terms of market capitalisation (see Table 1). Second,
we ﬁnd that the transaction cost parameter γ is signiﬁcantly negative, which is worrisome in
the context of the Glosten-model. Third, and most discomforting, the GMM J−test rejects
the model for 29 out of the 30 stocks.
We proceed with separate estimation of the break-even conditions and the updating
restrictions to analyse why the model is rejected. We ﬁnd that the α estimates based on
10the break-even conditions remain signiﬁcantly positive, whereas those based on the updating
restrictions turn insigniﬁcant for most of the stocks. It seems that α is identiﬁed primarily
through snapshots of the book at a single point in time and not on updating of the value vt
after the arrival of market orders. This evidence is consistent with Sand˚ as’ paper who ﬁnds
that the Glosten-αs estimated on the break-even conditions are about nine times higher than
those based on the updating restrictions (Sand˚ as (2001, Table 5)).
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we deviate from Sand˚ as’ (2001) struc-
tural approach, and rely on time series econometrics to study the importance of trade in-
formativeness for book liquidity. We abandon the structural model for two reasons. First,
the approach requires strong model assumptions in building the moment conditions (e.g.
exponential order size distribution, independence of Xt). These assumptions might not be
justiﬁable in real-world markets. Second, the model restricts the same parameter (α) to
capture the shape of the book and the value update based on arriving market orders. The
assumption is that the book replenishes and fully reveals the long-term impact (i.e. the
informational content) of the trade before the next market order arrives. In the time se-
ries approach, we separate book liquidity from informativeness of market orders to check
whether, as the Glosten-model predicts, book liquidity is low during times of highly infor-
mative market orders. We rely on Granger causality to identify such eﬀect.
4 Time Series Econometrics: Trade Informativeness
and Book Liquidity
In this section, we use the time series dimension to study trade informativeness and order
book liquidity. First, we analyse the time series properties of the trade informativeness
measure proposed by Hasbrouck (1991). Second, we motivate three measures for book
liquidity to capture both the spread and the depth of the book. Finally, we analyse the
interaction of trade informativeness and book liquidity based on a Granger-causality test
including appropriate control variables to isolate the eﬀects of interest.
For our analysis, we aggregate the event-time calendar used for GMM estimation.
In particular, we group N subsequent market orders into one time interval t. N is chosen in
order to retain suﬃcient observations to estimate Hasbrouck’s trade informativeness measure.
Our procedure is best explained by the following graph where trade arrivals are denoted by
11circles and N = 3:
snapshot 
time interval t+1 time interval t+2
snapshot  snapshot 
time interval t
time
orderbook t+1 orderbook t orderbook t−1
We choose N to trade oﬀ too few observations and too little time variation. We
therefore set N equal to 250 for the quartile of most actively traded stocks (Q1) yielding an
average of 14.9 periods per trading day, each lasting 34 minutes on average. We take less
observations per interval for the three other quartiles by setting N = 200 for Q2, N = 150
for Q3, and N = 100 for Q4. By deﬁnition, these quartiles trade less frequently than Q1 so
that for equal N we would obtain too few intra-day estimation intervals. Also, these smaller
values of N ensure that the average time lengths of the intervals are comparable to Q1. The
resulting average interval lengths are 43 minutes for Q2, 61 minutes for Q3, and 60 minutes
for Q4. For robustness checks, we try various values for N and ﬁnd that our main results
are not aﬀected.
4.1 Measuring Time-Varying Trade Informativeness
We use the N trades in a time interval to identify trade informativeness following closely
Hasbrouck (1991). The approach relies on estimates of the following bivariate vector autore-
gression (VAR):
rt,τ = a1trt,τ−1 + a2trt,τ−2 + ... + b0tXt,τ + b1tXt,τ−1 + b2tXt,τ−2 + ... + ut,τ (9)
Xt,τ = c1trt,τ−1 + c2trt,τ−2 + ... + d1tXt,τ−1 + d2tXt,τ−2 + ... + wt,τ
where τ ∈ {1,...,N} runs over all midquote changes in time interval t, rt,τ is the midquote
change from order book snapshot τ − 1 to snapshot τ in interval t, and Xt,τ is the signed
order size of trade τ in interval t (it is zero if there was no transaction at the time of the
midquote change). We use the subscript t to indicate the coeﬃcients that belong to time
interval t. We assume that the innovations ut,τ and wt,τ are i.i.d. and contemporaneously
12uncorrelated.
To identify the long-term impact of a trade, we consider the vector moving average
representation of the VAR in equation (9) (assuming stationarity):
rt,τ = ut,τ + a
∗
1tut,τ−1 + a
∗
2tut,τ−2 + ... + b
∗
0twt,τ + b
∗
1twt,τ−1 + ... (10)
Xt,τ = c
∗
1tut,τ−1 + c
∗
2tut,τ−2 + ... + wt,τ + d
∗
1twt,τ−1 + ... (11)
where b∗
0t identiﬁes the immediate price impact of a market order. The permanent price
impact of a market order in time interval t can now be obtained as:
α
H
t = (
∞  
i=0
b
∗
it)
e50,000
P 2 (12)
where the second factor on the right-hand side of the equation scales the coeﬃcient in the
same way as was done for the Glosten-α (see equation (8)).
[insert Table 3 here]
In the VAR estimations, we use ten lags to ensure uncorrelated residuals. Hasbrouck (1991)
chooses ﬁve VAR lags, and Dufour and Engle (2000), who extend Hasbrouck’s methodology,
choose the same lag length. The choice of ten lags in our sample ensures serially uncorrelated
VAR residual series for all stocks. The variation of the lag length within the range indicated
by Akaike information criteria does not aﬀect the results of the later stages which make
use of the trade informativeness estimates. The increased lag length which is indicated for
our recent data supports the view that order splitting/algorithmic trading became more
important since the early 1990s.
We follow Hasbrouck (1991) and truncate the inﬁnite sum of equation (12) at lag
forty. As above, we estimate the VAR stock by stock and report the quartile averages.
Table 3 reports the average Hasbrouck-α as well as its time series characteristics.
We ﬁnd that the average Hasbrouck-α is similar to the average Glosten-α. For the quartile
of most actively traded stocks (Q1), we ﬁnd an average αH of 0.08 basis points, which is
very close to the average αG of 0.09 basis points reported in Table 2. For the other quartiles,
the diﬀerences are somewhat larger, and the Hasbrouck-α is consistently smaller than the
Glosten-α. We interpret the similarity of the Glosten- and Habsrouck-α estimates, which are
13obtained by very diﬀerent methodologies, as further evidence that the updating restrictions
are a poor measure of trade informativeness in the GMM test of the Glosten-model. In
Section 3.3, we showed that separate estimation of the break-even conditions (based on
book depth) and updating restrictions shows that the (overall) Glosten-α estimate largely
captures book depth, as it is insigniﬁcant in the updating restrictions. Apparently, order
book changes in between market orders, captured by these updating restrictions, are not
able to identify trade informativeness. The Hasbrouck-α captures the long-term impact of
trades and its similarity to the Glosten-α can therefore be interpreted as support for the
Glosten-model.
[insert Figure 1 here]
We further ﬁnd that trade informativeness is a persistent, mean-reverting process with a
distinct intra-day pattern. Figure 1 plots the average αH for 90-minute intervals within the
trading day. We generally ﬁnd that informativeness decreases during the course of the day,
which is consistent with the hypothesis that the bulk of price discovery is taking place after
the opening of the market. For the quartile of most actively traded stocks (Q1), we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant increase of trade informativeness during the interval from 15:00 to 16:30 C.E.T.,
which contains the NYSE opening time (15:30 C.E.T.). Not surprisingly, all Q1 shares are
cross-listed in New York, whereas few of the stocks in the other quartiles are inter-listed.
Menkveld (2008) ﬁnds the same pattern for British and Dutch ADRs and argues that some
traders prefer to trade during the overlap and split orders in order to beneﬁt from two pools
of liquidity.
We remove intra-day seasonality (diurnality) of the αH estimates by dividing by the
time-of-day means, and then compute ﬁrst-order autocorrelations. We ﬁnd persistence as
ﬁrst-order autocorrelations are signiﬁcant for all quartiles, ranging from 0.28 to 0.38 (see
Table 3). We also report inter- and intra-day correlations separately, and ﬁnd that both are
positive, although only intra-day autocorrelations are statistically signiﬁcant.
The substantial time variation and predictability in trade informativeness is useful to
analyse how important trade informativeness is for book liquidity. The persistence suggests
that informative trades cluster in time so that we can discriminate times of informative
market order trading and times with relatively uninformed market orders. We will study
book liquidity at these times to gauge the importance of trade informativeness. Before we
turn to this analysis, we ﬁrst construct appropriate measures of book liquidity.
144.2 Measuring Time-Varying Book Liquidity
We summarise limit order book liquidity at snapshot t (taken at the end of the tth estimation
window) through three measures: the quoted bid-ask spread and two measures of book depth.
In the remainder of the paper, we focus on the results for the ask side of the limit order
book, and leave out the bid side to conserve space. The results are very similar for both
sides.
Our depth measures captures the price concession from the best ask rather than
the midquote in order to purge the measure of a quoted spread eﬀect (measured separately).
Price concessions are calculated for an average-sized and a large buy value. Price concessions
are calculated relative to a book state where the depth at the best ask can ﬁll the total volume
of the buy order. Formally, we use
ap(V ) =
 ∞
k=0 Ik(V )pkqk  ∞
k=0 Ik(V )p1qk
− 1 (13)
where
Ik(V ) =

 
 
1 if
 k
i=1 qipi ≤ V
V −
Pk−1
i=1 qipi
qkpk if
 k−1
i=0 qipi ≤ V <
 k
i=1 qipi
0 otherwise.
(14)
For ease of notation, we deﬁne a summation from i to j with j < i to be zero (as this
happens in the second line in equation (14) for k = 1. The depth measure ap(V ) is zero if
the market buy order of size V ﬁlls at the best ask and becomes strictly positive if it has to
walk up the book and consume the depth displayed at higher prices. A large price concession
indicated by a large ap(V ) therefore indicates poor book liquidity at and behind the best
quote. We compute the depth measure (13) for V = e50,000 and e200,000, respectively. In
the remainder of the paper, we use ap(50) and ap(200), respectively, to refer to these depth
measures.
4.3 Informativeness and Liquidity: Granger Causality
We use time-varying trade informativeness and book liquidity to determine whether trade
informativeness is an important determinant of book liquidity. We beneﬁt from slow mean-
reversion in the trade informativeness process to discriminate highly informative from rel-
15atively uninformative trade periods. We also study whether book liquidity predicts next
period trade informativeness, which could be the case when limit order submitters know of
an oncoming information event that is not predicted by the informativeness of lagged order
ﬂow (e.g. a pre-scheduled company news release).
For the remainder of the analysis we standardise all data series—α and the book
liquidity measures—in order to be able to compare across intra-day time intervals and across
stocks. For that purpose, we divide the trading day into six 90-minute time intervals (see
also Figure 1). For each stock and each variable, we then remove the diurnality by dividing
the time series xt by its time-of-day mean (i.e. we replace xt by xt/xi where i ∈ {1,...,6}
is the time interval t falls into and xi is the average of all xt in that interval). Furthermore,
in order to account for heteroskedasticity across stocks, we scale the resulting time series by
their stock-speciﬁc standard deviation (i.e. we replace the diurnally adjusted xt by xt/σxt
where σxt is the standard deviation of the diurnally adjusted xt). The slope coeﬃcients in the
Granger-causality analysis below should therefore be interpreted as the amount of change
of the dependent variable (in terms of its standard deviation) on a one standard deviation
change of the explanatory variable.
4.3.1 Trade informativeness as a determinant of book liquidity.
Before turning to the Granger causality analysis, we ﬁrst plot book liquidity against trade
informativeness. By construction, the book snapshot t is at the end of time interval t, which
contains the N trades that are used to calculate αH (see graph at the start of Section 4).
To study whether informativeness matters for subsequent book liquidity, we therefore plot
the three book liquidity measures against αH
t where we group the α into quartiles.
[insert Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 illustrates that book liquidity decreases monotonically in trade informative-
ness. Panel A illustrates that the bid-ask spread increases linearly in trade informativeness.
The spread is 10% higher at times of highest trade informativeness relative to times of low-
est trade informativeness. Panel B and C illustrate that trade informativeness has an even
stronger eﬀect on the two depth measures (ap(50) and ap(200), respectively) as depth is 20%
lower comparing the two tail quartiles. And, the marginal eﬀect seems to be increasing in
trade informativeness.
16We now turn to Granger causality regressions to study whether trade informativeness
causes book liquidity. We propose the following regression:
yt = c + δα
H
t + β1yt−1 + ... + βpyt−p + φ1z1,t + ... + φqzq,t + εt (15)
where yt is one of the three book liquidity measures (spread, ap(50), or ap(200)), zi,t are
control variables that are based on the N trades in time interval t to capture market condi-
tions other than trade informativeness. εt is an i.i.d. disturbance. The regression indicates
Granger causality if δ is statistically signiﬁcant so that trade informativeness explains book
liquidity over and above its predicted value based on its own past. By adding control vari-
ables, eﬀectively, we consider the component of trade informativeness that is orthogonal to
other indicators measuring trading conditions. If, in this case, δ is signiﬁcant, we can at-
tribute the eﬀect uniquely to informativeness and not to other correlated trading variables.
[insert Table 4 here]
Table 4 shows all control variables, their pairwise correlations, and their correlations
with αH
t and the three book liquidity measures. We use evidence from the microstructure
literature (see Madhavan (2000) or Biais et al. (2005) for a survey) to motivate ﬁve control
variables. First, we include the trade size averaged over the estimation interval (tsize).
This accounts for a potential size eﬀect driving the signiﬁcance of the trade informativeness
measure if large trades are more informative than small trades. Second, we include the
signed trade volume imbalance over the estimation interval (simb), in order to account
for an asymmetric eﬀect on book liquidity. Third, we add mean inter-trade time duration
over the estimation interval (dura) to control for fast markets that allegedly indicate more
informative trades (see Dufour and Engle (2000)). Fourth, we compute realised volatility (rv)
over the estimation interval. Including it as another control variable we aim to diﬀerentiate
trade informativeness from picking-oﬀ risk induced by volatility shocks caused by the arrival
of public information. rv is computed by summing squared midquote returns within the
estimation interval. Midquotes are sampled immediately before the trade events within
the interval. The idea to use high frequency sampled midquote changes to estimate and
forecast lower frequency fundamental price volatility goes back to Andersen et al. (2003).
Fifth, we add the absolute value of trade imbalance (imb) to control for trading volume.
We prefer this proxy to the conventional volume measure as it better captures the net
pressure on liquidity suppliers. The correlations of these ﬁve control variables with αH
t are
signiﬁcantly positive for trade size, duration, realised volatility, and volume. Periods with
17highly informative trades, therefore, tend to show large trades in slow markets with high
volatility and high volume. These correlations are as expected, except maybe for inter-trade
duration. Short trade durations in the Xetra limit order book setting are associated with
relatively uninformative trades. This is in contrast to the ﬁndings reported in Dufour and
Engle (2000) for the 1991 NYSE market. However, Grammig et al. (2007), who propose a
structural modelling alternative to Dufour and Engle’s (2000) time series approach, also ﬁnd
that fast trading in the Xetra limit order book cannot be associated with informed trading.
They refer to the crowding-out eﬀect described by Parlour (1998) to explain their ﬁnding.
Crowding-out means that ample liquidity - a market state that we do not associate with
asymmetric information - causes intense uninformed market order trading. By submitting a
market order, an impatient (yet not superiorly informed) trader can jump ahead of a lengthy
queue of limit orders at the best quotes.
[insert Table 5 here]
Panel A of Table 5 summarises the regression results using the quoted spread as
dependent variable. Trade informativeness is signiﬁcant for eight out of thirty stock-speciﬁc
regressions. The parameter carries the correct sign, since at times of high trade informa-
tiveness the book exhibits higher bid-ask spreads. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect is economically
signiﬁcant as a one standard deviation change of trade informativeness increases the spread
by 8% of its standard deviation. The quartile-speciﬁc results show that the eﬀect increases
monotonically in trade activity. It is strongest for the least actively traded stocks. Re-
garding the control variables, we ﬁnd that realised volatility is the only variable more often
signiﬁcant than trade informativeness (for fourteen stocks). It also has a stronger economic
signiﬁcance, as a one standard deviation increase in realised volatility increases the spread
by 15% of its standard deviation.
Panels B and C of Table 5 report the results for the two depth measures ap(50) and
ap(200) which show that trade informativeness is important primarily for depth further into
the book. Using ap(50) as dependent variable in (15), trade informativeness is statistically
signiﬁcant for six stocks, while it is statistically signiﬁcant for seventeen sample stocks when
ap(200) is used as the dependent variable in (15). The estimated coeﬃcients have the correct
sign, as high informativeness implies higher price concessions. The eﬀects are economically
signiﬁcant as a one standard deviation change in trade informativeness increases ap(50)
by 7% and ap(200) by 12% of the respective standard deviation. Trade informativeness is
economically and statistically more important than realised volatility, which is the second-
most relevant variable. For ap(200), we again ﬁnd a monotonic relationship across activity
18quartiles, where the least active quartile shows the strongest eﬀect.
4.3.2 Book liquidity as a determinant of trade informativeness.
The Glosten model does not only predict that informativeness Granger-causes book liquidity,
but also implies reverse causality. If limit order traders who ﬁll the book at the end of
period t know more about the oncoming period than what could be predicted from current
and past period informativeness, the book could Granger-cause next period informativeness.
For example, traders might know that a company is about to issue a press release, which,
of course, leads to an immediate quote update, but also to market orders that are highly
informative. This is the case when the public information leads to “allocational” trades due
to portfolio re-balancing based on public news (see Vayanos (2001)). The econometrician
cannot predict such event based on past trade informativeness.
We test whether book liquidity Granger-causes trade informativeness through the
following regression:
α
H
t = c+β1α
H
t−1 +...+βpα
H
t−p +δ1y1,t−1 +...+δryr,t−1 +φ1z1,t−1 +...+φqzq,t−1 +εt (16)
where the control variables zi,t are the same as in equation (15). For the measures of
book liquidity, yi,t, we use quoted spread and our two price concession measures ap(50) and
ap(200). We add a book asymmetry measure that is deﬁned as the ask price concession
minus the bid price concession: dpi50 = ap(50)-bp(50) and dpi200 = ap(200)-bp(200). A
low value indicates that it is more expensive to sell than to buy, which might foreshadow a
downturn. Facing a downturn threat, limit order traders might rely more on the direction of
future market orders for price discovery. This would imply increased trade informativeness.
[insert Table 6 here]
The regression results in Table 6 indicate that book liquidity Granger-causes trade informa-
tiveness. We ﬁnd that a high quoted spread causes trades to be signiﬁcantly more informative
in the oncoming period for 11 out of 30 stocks. In addition, we ﬁnd that low depth causes
increased trade informativeness, albeit primarily for ap(200). We ﬁnd it to be signiﬁcant
for 22 stocks. Interestingly, the book depth asymmetry measure for large trades is also sig-
niﬁcant for 15 stocks. The negative sign of the parameter estimate is consistent with the
intuition that market orders are more informative when selling is relatively expensive. As
19for the control variables, we ﬁnd strong statistical signiﬁcance only for trade size, as large
trades predict lower trade informativeness in the oncoming period for 17 stocks.
5 Discussion of the Results
Overall, we ﬁnd evidence that trade informativeness matters for book liquidity in limit
order markets. Along with realised volatility it performs better than any other variable
that captures trading conditions such as trading intensity, trading volume and order book
imbalance. There are, however, some issues that are worthy of discussion.
First, we want to emphasise that book liquidity and trade informativeness are not
the same thing. It is true that on poor book liquidity subsequent market orders have a
large price concession by deﬁnition. However, it is not the immediate price impact that
represents the adverse-selection that the Glosten model accounts for. In fact, part of the
price concession is temporary and exists to compensate liquidity suppliers for their order-
processing cost. In theory, if market orders are not informative (as assumed in most of the
dynamic models) all of the price concession would be temporary.
Second, the Granger causality results warrant some discussion. When constructing
the data series for the causality test, we are forced to aggregate across market orders and
create time intervals. We do this to estimate the Hasbrouck model and determine the long-
term price impact of a trade. In the test, we pursue the Granger causality idea that one
should have explanatory power beyond from what can be predicted from a series’ own past.
One could argue that we have not accurately controlled for book liquidity’s own past, as
we include only lagged book snapshots from before the trade interval. Ideally, we want to
include the snapshot from before the previous market order, but we cannot do this as we
need the aggregation to identify the long-term price impact. An alternative interpretation of
our test is that it does show that trade informativeness is signiﬁcant in explaining subsequent
book liquidity beyond the prediction from its own past from before the trade interval.
206 Conclusion
We analyse three months of limit order book data—January through March 2004—from the
German Stock Exchange for the thirty DAX stocks to test the predictions of the Glosten
(1994) model. One of the key predictions is that order books are ﬁlled by competitive limit
order traders, so that, in equilibrium, the marginal order just earns enough to make up
for order-processing cost and the adverse-selection cost of executing against a (potentially)
privately informed market order.
First, we follow Sand˚ as (2001) and estimate the parameters of the Glosten model di-
rectly using GMM. We reject the model econometrically and diagnose that the key parameter
α, which measures the level of private information in market orders, is primarily identiﬁed
on book restrictions and not on the updating restrictions that should track the information
in the trade. Second, we leave the structural model and exploit the time dimension to study
whether trade informativeness matters for book liquidity. We develop measures for book
liquidity and use the Hasbrouck (1991) methodology to gauge trade informativeness. We
document that trade informativeness Granger-causes book liquidity with the strongest sta-
tistical and economical signiﬁcance for large order price concessions (“behind the market”).
To robustify these results we control for various other determinants of LOB liquidity, such
as realised volatility, trading intensity, trade size, and order book imbalance. Among these,
we ﬁnd that only realised volatility rivals trade informativeness in terms of economic and
statistical signiﬁcance. In particular, realised volatility is more relevant for top-of-the-book
liquidity, whereas informativeness is more important for beyond-the-best-quote liquidity.
We interpret these results as support for prominent theoretical models of limit order
book markets. First, our ﬁnding that trade informativeness is one of the most important
explanatory factors for book liquidity supports Glosten’s (1994) model which explains order
book equilibrium with order-processing costs and information asymmetry. Second, the ﬁnd-
ing that realised volatility is more important than trade informativeness for top-of-the-book
liquidity supports a key result of dynamic limit order book models like that developed by
Foucault (1999). These models start from symmetric information and assume that the key
cost to limit orders is picking-oﬀ risk. That is, limit orders are costly if they are consumed
before cancelled on the arrival of public information. This cost is particularly relevant “at
the market”, which explains the result that realised volatility is more important than trade
informativeness for top-of-the-book liquidity.
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Notes
1We deﬁne “price concession” as the hypothetical transaction price for a given trade volume relative to a
reference price (e.g., the midquote or the best quote). For limit order markets, we prefer price concession to
the bid-ask half spread as a measure of liquidity, since depth at the best quote is often too small to transact
the market order, which then runs up the book.
2Traders seem to transact in terms of value, not in terms of number of shares. That is, we ﬁnd that
the average value per trades is similar across stocks, which is not true for the average number of shares per
trade. The reason is that, in the cross-section, stocks trade at diﬀerent price levels.
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Ticker Company Name market cap. % agg. daily nb. daily nb. daily nb. price spread spread activity
(mill. e) trades trades subm. cancel. (e) (e) (%) quartile
ALV ALLIANZ 33,805 21.4 4,523 29,791 25,882 100.1 0.05 0.05
Q1
DTE DEUTSCHE TELEKOM 34,858 5.0 4,445 14,498 11,009 15.7 0.01 0.07
SIE SIEMENS 52,893 16.7 4,418 23,659 19,920 64.0 0.03 0.05
DBK DEUTSCHE BANK 38,228 19.3 3,961 23,169 19,772 67.2 0.03 0.05
MUV2 MUENCHENER RUECK 16,396 20.7 3,425 20,154 16,894 93.9 0.06 0.06
DCX DAIMLERCHRYSLER 30,316 14.5 3,309 18,722 15,919 36.4 0.02 0.06
EOA E.ON 33,753 13.6 2,871 18,899 16,468 52.5 0.03 0.06
SAP SAP 27,412 21.9 2,806 19,733 17,095 131.5 0.08 0.06
Q2
IFX INFINEON 4,790 8.6 2,799 10,320 7,744 11.6 0.01 0.10
BAS BASF 25,425 13.8 2,580 18,211 15,898 43.3 0.03 0.06
VOW VOLKSWAGEN 9,688 16.0 2,545 13,474 11,273 39.2 0.03 0.07
BAY BAYER 15,911 12.4 2,400 15,258 12,988 23.1 0.02 0.08
RWE RWE 12,653 13.0 2,314 14,438 12,355 33.8 0.03 0.08
BMW BMW 12,211 14.4 2,110 14,736 12,764 34.7 0.02 0.07
HVM BAY.HYP.VEREINSBANK 6,629 15.0 1,937 10,204 8,293 18.7 0.02 0.11
SCH SCHERING 7,055 16.2 1,523 9,111 7,669 40.8 0.04 0.09
Q3
CBK COMMERZBANK 7,569 12.6 1,450 11,922 10,476 15.4 0.02 0.11
LHA LUFTHANSA 4,548 11.9 1,352 8,079 6,780 14.2 0.02 0.12
DPW DEUTSCHE POST 6,806 11.0 1,315 6,861 5,666 18.2 0.02 0.11
TKA THYSSEN-KRUPP 6,450 11.3 1,262 7,864 6,672 15.9 0.02 0.13
MEO METRO 5,018 15.7 1,235 7,975 6,702 35.0 0.04 0.12
ALT ALTANA 3,338 18.9 1,095 7,718 6,609 48.6 0.05 0.10
TUI TUI 2,025 17.6 1,063 6,767 5,714 18.7 0.03 0.14
MAN MAN 2,434 13.0 1,057 7,214 6,235 27.7 0.03 0.12
Q4
CONT CONTINENTAL 4,060 13.5 1,002 8,036 7,052 31.6 0.04 0.11
DB1 DEUTSCHE BOERSE 4,847 18.4 982 6,598 5,698 46.9 0.04 0.10
ADS ADIDAS-SALOMON 4,104 20.1 980 8,057 7,105 92.6 0.08 0.09
LIN LINDE 3,448 15.8 896 8,342 7,454 43.6 0.05 0.11
HEN3 HENKEL 3,682 16.6 702 7,989 7,306 65.9 0.07 0.10
FME FRESENIUS 1,944 16.7 621 5,764 5,195 54.0 0.07 0.13
Average 14,076 15.2 2,099 12,785 10,887 44.5 0.04 0.09
Note: The statistics are computed based on market event data covering the sample period January 2, 2004 to March 31, 2004. Column market
cap. gives the market capitalisation of the respective stock in million euros at the end of December 2003. % agg. trades is the percentage of
total trading volume executed beyond the best quotes (aggressive trades). daily nb. trades denotes the average daily number of trades. Column
daily nb. subm. reports the average number of order submissions per day, market orders excluded and daily nb. cancel. the average number
of order cancellations per day. price (e), spread (e) and spread (%) are average midquote, spread and relative spread over the three months
sample period. The stocks are sorted into four groups (activity quartiles, Q1-Q4) according to their trading frequency, i.e. by the column daily
nb. trades. Horizontal lines separate the four groups.
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6Table 2: Estimation results of the S˚ andas/Glosten model
.
α × 103 γ λ cv × 103 J(9) no reject αG × 103
all stocks
0.013 -0.010 1.380 0.030
643.7 2 0.326
167.3 52.5 133.1 2.2
Q1 0.009 -0.006 1.600 0.029
1985.3 0 0.087
(most active) 249.6 50.5 188.8 2.5
Q2
0.008 -0.008 1.724 0.088
539.8 0 0.189
170.3 55.7 147.1 2.0
Q3
0.008 -0.010 1.517 -0.063
91.9 1 0.471
143.1 54.9 108.5 2.1
Q4 0.029 -0.018 0.610 0.071
51.6 1 0.555
(least active) 109.3 48.2 89.4 2.1
Note: The estimation uses the information from the best four quotes of the visible books to form update
and break-even conditions. The table reports in bold face font the ﬁrst stage GMM estimates of α, γ, λ
and cv which are averaged across all stocks as well as across the stocks in the respective trading activity
quartile. The values printed in regular font are t−values which are also group averages. The J(9) column
is the group average of the GMM J− statistic (with 9 degrees of freedom). Column no reject reports the
number of stocks for which the model is not rejected at 1% signiﬁcance level. The last column reports the
group averages of the standardised trade informativeness measure αG (Glosten-α, see equation (8)).
27Table 3: Cross-sectional and time series properties of estimated trade informativeness measures
αH and immediate impacts bH.
αH × 103 min max ρ ρinter ρintra bH × 103
all stocks 0.244 -0.016 0.963 0.328 0.162 0.352 0.139
Q1 0.076 0.005 0.279 0.365 0.158 0.387 0.042
(most active) 0.021 0.002 0.056 0.051 0.166 0.055 0.011
Q2 0.152 -0.011 0.649 0.355 0.168 0.380 0.089
0.041 0.034 0.260 0.114 0.181 0.113 0.025
Q3 0.335 -0.006 1.282 0.282 0.155 0.309 0.199
0.094 0.015 0.386 0.067 0.185 0.061 0.056
Q4 0.412 -0.055 1.639 0.311 0.166 0.333 0.224
(least active) 0.122 0.066 0.422 0.046 0.088 0.058 0.074
Note: The table reports sample means (bold font) and standard deviations (regular font) of αH (Hasbrouck-
α (see equation (12)) and the immediate impact computed as bH =
b050,000
P 2 (see equations 10-12). Both αH
and bH are diurnally adjusted. For that purpose, the trading day is divided into 90 minutes intervals and
the (stock speciﬁc) sample mean of αH and bH in each interval is computed. Diurnally adjusted variables
result from dividing the raw series by the corresponding time-of-day means. To compute sample means and
standard deviations reported in the table, the diurnally adjusted series are pooled (overall and by trade size
quartile, respectively). The columns labelled min and max report the group averages of the smallest and
largest αH estimate (×103) for each stock. Column ρ reports the autocorrelation of the diurnally adjusted
αH sequence. ρinter is the inter-day correlation of the diurnally adjusted Hasbrouck-α, i.e. the correlation
between the previous day’s last and the next day’s ﬁrst αH estimate. ρintra is the intra-day serial correlation
of the diurnally adjusted αH. Observations from diﬀerent trading days are excluded for this computation.
Bold (regular) faced numbers are group averages (standard deviations) of the autocorrelations computed in
this way.
28Table 4: Correlation between the trade informativeness, liquidity measures and control variables.
αH ap(50) ap(200) spread tsize simb dura rv
ap(50) 0.11∗∗
ap(200) 0.19∗∗ 0.69∗∗
spread 0.11∗∗ -0.04∗∗ 0.00
tsize -0.46∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.01
simb -0.02∗ 0.00 -0.01 0.02∗ 0.03∗∗
dura 0.11∗∗ 0.01 -0.01 -0.02∗∗ -0.34∗∗ -0.01
rv 0.28∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.00 -0.14∗∗
imb -0.21∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.06∗∗ -0.22∗∗ 0.06∗∗
Note: The table reports cross sectional averages of correlation coeﬃcients for the DAX30 stocks. ap(50) and
ap(200) denote the hypothetical ask side price concessions for trades of e50,000 and e200,000, respectively.
spread is the quoted spread in basis points. These liquidity measures are sampled just before the ﬁrst trade
occurs after the αH estimation interval. tsize denotes the trade size and dura the duration between two
consecutive trades averaged over the estimation interval. simb is the sum of the signed traded volumes
over the estimation interval; imb is the absolute value of simb. Realised volatility (rv) is computed as the
sum of the squared midquote returns with midquotes sampled just before a trade event occurs within the
estimation interval. All series are diurnally adjusted. For that purpose the trading day is divided into
90 minutes intervals and the (stock speciﬁc) mean of the respective variable in each interval is computed.
Diurnally adjusted variables result from dividing the raw series by their corresponding time-of-day means.
Computation of the correlations is based on an average (across stocks) of T = 692 observations. ** and *
indicate a mean correlation that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1 % and 5 % level, respectively.
The standard errors of the mean correlations are approximated by 1 √
TN where N = 30.
29Table 5: Regression of book liquidity measures on trade informativeness and control variables.
αH rv tsize dura imb simb lag1 lag2 R2
adj
All stocks 0.080 0.147 -0.015 -0.005 0.047 0.014 0.001 0.004 0.051
Panel A
sig pos
(of 30)
8 14 0 2 5 0 0 0
spread
sig neg 0 0 3 3 0 1 1 0
Q1 (most active) 0.043 0.125 -0.065 -0.037 0.035 0.034 -0.010 0.003 0.034
Q2 0.068 0.168 -0.012 -0.015 0.043 0.007 -0.003 -0.012 0.061
Q3 0.089 0.192 0.002 0.005 0.036 -0.007 -0.007 0.024 0.067
Q4 (least active) 0.121 0.095 0.011 0.025 0.076 0.024 0.024 0.002 0.038
All stocks 0.068 0.063 -0.041 -0.008 0.004 0.003 0.009 0.005 0.015
Panel B
sig pos
(of 30)
6 5 0 0 0 1 0 0
ap(50)
sig neg 0 0 4 0 1 1 1 1
Q1 (most active) 0.077 0.047 0.022 -0.007 -0.030 0.018 0.002 0.012 0.010
Q2 0.060 0.041 -0.069 -0.010 0.034 0.013 0.014 -0.015 0.010
Q3 0.043 0.110 -0.056 -0.017 -0.009 -0.022 -0.001 0.013 0.019
Q4 (least active) 0.097 0.050 -0.055 0.004 0.017 0.006 0.021 0.011 0.022
All stocks 0.117 0.096 -0.072 -0.030 0.014 -0.004 0.041 0.042 0.054
Panel C
sig pos
(of 30)
17 13 0 0 1 1 1 4
ap(200)
sig neg 0 0 5 1 1 2 0 1
Q1 (most active) 0.108 0.099 -0.035 -0.036 0.005 0.001 -0.010 0.018 0.034
Q2 0.107 0.085 -0.082 -0.034 0.041 -0.006 0.052 0.030 0.048
Q3 0.124 0.126 -0.073 -0.030 -0.004 -0.005 0.046 0.046 0.064
Q4 (least active) 0.129 0.071 -0.096 -0.018 0.012 -0.006 0.076 0.076 0.071
Note: The book liquidity indicators spread, ap(50) and ap(200) are regressed on the trade-informativeness indicator αH and control variables.
The liquidity indicators are sampled just before the ﬁrst trade occurs after the αH estimation interval. The regression also includes (in addition
to a constant and two lags of the dependent variable) the control variables realised volatility (rv), trade size (tsize), trade duration (dura),
unsigned trade imbalance (imb) and signed trade imbalance (simb). All variables are diurnally adjusted. See table 4 for computational details
of the procedure. To obtain comparable estimates across stocks dependent variables and regressors are standardised by division by the sample
standard deviations. The table reports OLS estimates averaged across stocks. sig pos (sig neg) counts the number of signiﬁcant and positive
(negative) coeﬃcients. The signiﬁcance level is 5%. Adjusted coeﬃcients of determination are averaged across stocks. The regressions use on
average 692 observations. Per activity quartile we have 953 (Q1), 744 (Q2), 516 (Q3), 537 (Q4) observations on average.
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0Table 6: Regression of trade informativeness (Hasbrouck-α) on liquidity measures and control variables.
book liquidity indicators control variables
spread ap(50) ap(200) dpi50 dpi200 rv tsize dura imb simb lag1 lag2 R2
adj
All stocks 0.043 -0.070 0.204 0.030 -0.098 0.023 -0.096 0.045 0.004 0.005 0.189 0.130 0.164
sig pos
(of 30)
11 0 22 2 0 3 0 7 1 0 27 26
sig neg 0 6 0 0 15 0 17 0 0 2 0 0
Q1 0.064 -0.064 0.152 0.044 -0.081 0.048 -0.097 0.019 0.022 0.026 0.226 0.155 0.184
Q2 0.048 -0.088 0.208 0.044 -0.119 0.012 -0.115 0.047 0.006 -0.007 0.205 0.158 0.194
Q3 0.038 -0.040 0.193 -0.002 -0.074 0.004 -0.097 0.051 -0.009 0.000 0.161 0.097 0.124
Q4 0.020 -0.089 0.266 0.038 -0.118 0.033 -0.073 0.061 -0.003 0.005 0.167 0.111 0.156
Note: The trade informativeness measure αH is regressed on the book liquidity measures spread, ap50, ap200, as well as dpi50 and dpi200 which
denote the diﬀerence between the ask and the bid price concession for a hypothetical trade of e50,000 and e200,000, respectively. The liquidity
indicators are sampled before the ﬁrst trade occurs after the previous αH estimation interval. The regression also includes (in addition to a
constant and two lags of the dependent variable) the control variables realised volatility (rv), trade size (tsize), trade duration (dura), unsigned
trade imbalance (imb) and signed trade imbalance (simb). These variables are computed using data from the previous αH estimation interval.
All variables are diurnally adjusted. See table 4 for computational details of the procedure. To obtain comparable estimates across stocks, the
dependent variable and the regressors are standardised by division by the sample standard deviations. The table reports stock group averages of
the OLS estimates. sig pos (sig neg) counts the number of signiﬁcant and positive (negative) coeﬃcients. The signiﬁcance level is 5%. Adjusted
coeﬃcients of determination are averaged across stocks. The regressions use on average T = 692 observations. Per activity quartile we have 953
(Q1), 744 (Q2), 516 (Q3), 537 (Q4) observations on average.
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1Figure 1: Time-of-day patterns of the trade informativeness measure αH
j .
Left Panel: Q1 (most active) right panel: Q2
Left Panel: Q3 right panel: Q4 (least active)
Note: The four panels of the ﬁgure show 90 minutes averages of the estimated trade informativeness measures
αH
j . The averages are computed over all αH
j estimates in the respective 90 min. interval and over all stocks
belonging to the respective trading activity quartile. The top left panel displays the results for the ﬁrst
quartile (most actively traded), the top right panel for the second quartile, the bottom left panel for the
third quartile and the bottom right panel for the fourth quartile (least active). The dashed lines represent
bounds of the 95% conﬁdence interval.
32Figure 2: Book liquidity measures versus trade informativeness.
Panel A
Panel B
Panel C
Note: We pool time series of trade informativeness measures αH (Hasbrouck-α) for the 30 stocks and sort
them into quintiles. We then compute the quintile means of the book snapshot variables spread, ap(50) and
ap(200). Quintile means are represented as dots connected with solid lines. The small dots connected with
dashed lines are bounds of the 95% conﬁdence intervals. Both αH and book liquidity measures are diurnally
adjusted (division by time-of-day mean) prior to the analysis. Diurnally adjusted book liquidity variables
are multiplied by 100 to obtain percentages.
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